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ECM techniques against monopulse radars, which are generally employed in
the Surface-to-Air Missile targeting system, are presented and analyzed. Partic-
ularly, these ECM techniques classified into five different categories, which are;
denial jamming, deception jamming, passive countermeasures, decoys, and de-
structive countermeasures. The techniques are fully discussed. It was found
difficult to quantize the jamming effectiveness of individual techniques, because
ECM techniques are involved with several complex parameters and they are
usually entangled together. Therefore, the methodological approach for optimiz-
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Electronic warfare (EW) has been principally concerned with techniques for
seeking out enemy targets in either normal or countermeasure environments using
such electronic systems as radio or radar or, for preventing the enemy from de-
tecting friendly targets, using electronic countermeasures (ECM). Electronic
counter countermeasures (ECCM) represent techniques for reducing the effec-
tiveness of ECM. The development of these EW techniques was caused by the
interaction between enemy and friendly electronic systems. This was true of the
development of radar and its countermeasures which is a typical example of this
interaction process.
The word radar was a code name used by the US Navy in 1940, and is an
acronym derived from the phrase RAdio Detection And Ranging [Ref. 1: p.l].
Before world war two, radar had been developed independently and simul-
taneously in several countries. During world war two, the use of radar became
widespread due to the increase of air attacks by the allies and the Germans.
Since the advent of radar, air strikes have not obtained as good results. In
order to thwart the operation of radar systems, both sides employed ECM devices
which were made of thin aluminum foil strips. This kind of ECM technique was
extremely effective in jamming the radar systems of that time. These objects be-
came designated as "chaff* or "window" [Ref. 2: p.l 15 & p.252].
During the Korean war which broke out in 1950. the equipment and tactics
of electronic warfare were essentially the same as those of world war two. Nev-
ertheless, electronic warfare was indispensable by the end of 1951. According to
the official united states air force (USAF) history, the aircraft and crew losses
would have been triple the actual losses during the last two years of the war,
without the use of electronic warfare [Ref. 3].
In the Vietnam war, surface to air missiles (SAM) and anti-aircraft artillery
(AAA) greatly impacted the air campaign during the initial stages. To reduce the
losses from the enemy ground threat, individual US fighters had "PODS" in-
stalled which were flexible jamming systems, adapted to the ever-changing radar
threat [Ref. 2: p.253, Ref. 3: pp.2-3].
In the Yom Kippur war of October 1973, approximately 30% of the prewar
Israeli aircraft were shot down by the new Egyptian SAM and AAA systems
[Ref. 3: p. 3, Ref. 4: pp.36-39]. This war showed that old countermeasure tech-
niques were inadequate against the new systems.
The now familiar development pattern of radar and its countermeasures,
searching for new responses to changing threats, is apparent.
In modern warfare, SAM systems which utilize acquisition and tracking ra-
dars are major threats for hampering air operations. In order to achieve the goal
of air operations, it is essential to nullify the SAM batteries using proper
countermeasure techniques or to destroy them. When we apply countermeasures
to radar system, we need an understanding of the various types of radar systems
and their principles of operations. Each type makes use of a variety of different
techniques that are vulnerable to varying degrees.
The main topic of this thesis is related to monopulse radar. Monopulse radar,
pioneered in the US in the late 1940s and early 1950s, to provide more precise
tracking of targets for anti-aircraft missile systems, is being widely deployed by
the USSR for the same function. It is intrinsically much less vulnerable than
earlier conical scan type radars to deceptive type countermeasures, specifically
those ECM techniques which generate spurious data on aircraft position in
azimuth, elevation and range. Due to the several advantages of monopulse ra-
dars, the Soviets have been using increasing numbers of them with their anti-
aircraft missile systems, both ground and ship based.
The objective of this thesis is to determine optimum ECM techniques which
apply against the monopulse acquisition and tracking radars that are used for
SAM targeting.
B. COMPARISON OF SEQUENTIAL AND MONOPULSE RADARS
According to angle tracking method, tracking radars fall into two distinct
categories. They are the continuous tracking radar and the track-while-scan
(TWS) radar. The first provides continuous tracking data on a single target, the
second, TWS radar, provides near simultaneous tracking data on multiple
targets.
In continuous tracking radar, the antenna is pointed at the selected target
by a servomechanism actuated by an error signal. Several techniques are used for
the detection of target angular errors.
One method of obtaining the direction and the magnitude of the angular er-
ror is lobe switching, also called sequential switching or sequential lobing, which
is done by alternatively changing the antenna beam between two positions. This
method generates two overlapping beams which have a small angular separation















Figure 1. Lobe switching antenna patterns in one dimension, (a) Polar fonn.(b)
Rectangular form.
In order for lobe switching to complete angle tracking in elevation and
azimuth, it requires a minimum of four successive beam positions as shown in














Figure 2. Tmo categories of sequential lobing. (a) Lobe switching beam pattern in
two dimension, (b) Conical scan with 8 beams per scan.
Another method is conical scanning. It is a logical extension of the lobe
switching technique. The beam rotates continuously in a circular path, centered
around the crossover axis, rather than stepwise motion of the beam between four
discrete positions. Even though the beam motion is continuous in conical scan,
the receiving target echo will be displayed only when each transmitted pulse re-
aches the target. For example, if the scanning rate is forty times per second, and
the pulse repetition frequency is 320 pulse per second, there are eight beam posi-
tions per scan as shown in Figure 2 (b). The above two methods, lobe switching
and conical scan, are included in the general term, sequential lobing [Ref. 6: p. 5].
A principal source of error in these methods is the fluctuation of echo signal
caused by fluctuating target cross section. Pulse-to-pulsc amplitude fluctuations
of the echo signal can degrade the accuracy of the tracking radars which need
many pulses to generate the error signal.
Another disadvantage of sequential lobing is the limitation on the data rate
with its required four minimum successive echo pulses for the complete angle
tracking in azimuth and elevation. This can be a serious limitation in target
tracking of large angular accelerations. There is the further disadvantage that
mechanical vibration makes it hard to maintain accurate boresight alignment in
conical scan radars.
In order to eliminate these and other problems, monopulse techniques were
developed. Monopulse has several advantages comparing with lobe switching
and conical scan techniques [Ref. 6: pp. 6-7].
Monopulse operation is similar in concept to lobe switching, but instead of
comparing the target echoes obtained from sequential beam positions, it receives
several target echoes simultaneously and then makes the comparisons on the basis
of a single pulse. Therefore monopulse can provide a higher data rate than the
other techniques because angle information is available from every received pulse.
Theoretically, monopulse radars are free of errors due to pulse-to-pulse fluc-
tuations in target echo intensity because the fluctuations have no effect on the
ratio of signals received simultaneously from opposing lobes during each pulse.
Assuming that the other radar parameters are the same, the Signal-to-Noise
Ratio (SNRj is higher in monopulse since the sum beam is pointed at the target
both in transmission and reception. This results in better detection capability and
less tracking error due to thermal noise.
Monopulse has better stability of the boresight axis because this technique
does not use the mechanical vibration of the feed or reflector.
In sequential lobing techniques, scanning information is disclosed easily to an
unfriendly observer. It makes the radar vulnerable to some countermeasures
which utilize that information. However, monopulse transmission has no scan
during tracking.
In conical scan, the scan rate has an effect on tracking range. This is because
the beam direction between transmission and reception must be the same within
certain limits. Monopulse is free of this restriction. The pulse repetition frequency
(PRF) is the only factor limiting the maximum unambiguous range in monopulse.
The disadvantages of monopulse over the other techniques are complexity
and high cost. Monopulse requires multiple receivers, while the other techniques
need only one. In addition, monopulse receivers must be well designed and
matched to track one another in gain and phase.
C. OVERVIEW
This thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter one describes the differ-
ences between sequential lobing and simultaneous lobing or monopulse tracking
methods. Chapter two describes the basic principles of monopulse radars, espe-
cially two distinctive categories; amplitude-comparison monopulse and phase-
comparison monopulse. Chapter three contains various ECM techniques against
monopulse radars in accordance with the five different categories. They are: de-
nial jamming, deception jamming, passive jamming, decoys, and destructive
methods. Chapter four analyzes these ECM techniques conceptually. Finally,
chapter five arrives at the conclusions regarding the employment of the various
techniques.
II. MONOPULSE TRACKING RADAR SYSTEMS
A. MONOPULSE CONCEPT
Sequential-lobing techniques, including conical scan used earlier for target
tracking, are found to be degraded in angle tracking accuracy by the effects of
target scintillation. To eliminate this source of error, the technique for finding
precise direction by comparing the return echo on two or more antenna lobes si-
multaneously was developed. Sequential-lobing tracking radar including conical
scan require a minimum of four pulses in order to extract the angle error signal.
Monopulse tracking radar, however, needs just one pulse.
Pulse-to-pulse amplitude fluctuations of the echo signal have no effect on
tracking accuracy if the angular measurement is made on the basis of one pulse
rather than many. There are several methods by which angle error data might
be obtained with only a single pulse. More than one antenna beam is used si-
multaneously in these methods, compared with the lobe-switching or conical scan
tracker which use one antenna beam on a time-shared basis. The angle direction
of the echo signal can be determined in a single pulse system by measuring the
relative phase or the relative amplitude of the echo signal received in each beam.
The names simultaneous lobing and monopulse are used to describe those track-
ing techniques which extract angle error information on the basis of a single
pulse.
B. TWO DISTINCTIVE CATEGORIES
1. Amplitude-Comparison Monopulse Radar
The basic amplitude-comparison monopulse [Ref. 5: pp. 160- 164] utilizes
two overlapping antenna beams to obtain an angle error signal. The radar senses
the target displacement by comparing the amplitude of the received echo signals.
These two beams may be generated with a reflector or a lens antenna illuminated
by two adjacent feeds. The basic amplitude-comparison monopulse system is
shown in Figure 3. Figure 3 (a) shows the overlapping antenna patterns. If the
target is deviated by an angle from the equisignal boresight axis the signal re-
ceived from that side of the beam pattern has a greater amplitude than that from
the other side. Figure 3 (b) shows the sum pattern and Figure 3 (c) shows the
difference pattern. The sum pattern is used for target amplitude detection and
as a reference signal, while the difference patterns are used for angle discrimi-
nation. Signals received from the sum and the difference patterns are amplified
separately and combined in a phase detector to produce the error signal charac-








Figure 3. Monopulse antenna patterns (Polar and Rectangular form) and error sig-
nal.
Amplitude-comparison monopulse radars may be implemented in either
one or both angular coordinates. Figure 4 shows a block diagram of the
amplitude-comparison monopulse radar for a single angular coordinate. The
two adjacent antenna feeds are usually connected with electromagnetic field
comparison circuits such as a hybrid junction or a "magic T". It has a only two
channels. The transmission line connected to the sum channel provides range and
phase reference information. The angle error signal is generated by phase detec-
tor. The sign of the difference pattern points out the detected targets direction
relative to boresight (left/right), (up/down).
For example, in the case of azimuth, plus sign could mean right-side and
minus sign left-side. In case of the elevation, opposite signs mean up or down. If
the target is located on boresight, the difference pattern produces zero magnitude
of angular error. The plus and minus signs actually mean in-phase and 180°
out-phase, relative to the sum or reference channel. The magnitude of angle error
signal is proportional to the angular error and the sign of angular error is pro-
portional to the targets direction relative to boresight. These angular error signals
















Figure 4. Block diagram of amplitude-comparison monopulse radar (one angular
coordinate).
Even though phase comparison is intrinsically a part of amplitude-
comparison monopulse radar, the angular error signal is basically derived by
comparing the echo amplitudes from simultaneous offset beams. The phase re-
lationship between the signals in the offset beams is not used. The purpose of the





































Figure 5. Block diagram of two-coordinate (azimuth and elevation) amplitude-
comparison monopulse tracking radar.
Figure 5 shows a block diagram of an amplitude-comparison monopulse
radar with both elevation and azimuth error signals. The cluster of four feeds
makes four partially overlapping antenna beams. The feeds might be utilized with
a parabolic reflector, Cassegrain antenna, or a lens. The sum pattern is formed
by all four feeds. The difference pattern in one plane is formed by taking the sum
of two adjacent feeds and subtracting this from the sum of the other two adjacent
feeds. The difference pattern in the orthogonal plane is obtained by combining
the differences q[ the orthogonal adjacent pairs. Four hybrid junctions generate
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three channels which are the sum channel, elevation difference channel and
azimuth difference channel. Three separate mixers and IF amplifiers are installed,
one for each channel. All three mixers operate from a single local oscillator in
order to maintain the phase relationships between the three channels. Two phase
detectors extract the angle error information, one for azimuth, the other for ele-
vation. Range information is extracted from the output of the sum channel after
envelope detection.
The monopulse antenna must generate a sum pattern with high efficiency
and a difference pattern with a large value of slope at the crossover of the offset
beams. The greater the SNR and the steeper the slope of the error signal in the
vicinity of zero angular error, the more accuracy in the measurement of angle.
Moreover, the sidelobes of both the sum and difference patterns must be low.
The antenna must be capable of the desired bandwidth, and the patterns must
have the desired polarization characteristics. It is difficult to fully achieve of all
these properties simultaneously. Thus antenna design is an important part of
good monopulse radar operation.
Automatic gain control (AGC) is required in order to keep a stable
closed-loop servo system for angle tracking. The AGC in a monopulse radar is
accomplished by employing a voltage proportional to the sum channel
IF-amplifiers output in order to control the gain of all three receiver channels.
The AGC results in a constant angle sensitivity regardless of target size and
range.
2. Phase-Comparison Monopulse Radar
In this technique target angle is sensed by comparing the phase of the
signals received by two separate antennas. Phase-comparison monopulse [Ref.
5: pp. 165- 167] is similar in many ways to amplitude-comparison monopulse.
However, unlike the antennas of amplitude-comparison trackers, those used in
phase-comparison systems are not offset from the axis. The individual boresight
axis of the antennas are parallel.
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Therefore, if the target is on the antenna boresight axis, there is no phase
shift, namely, in phase. If the target moves off the antenna boresight axis, there
exists phase difference which points out the angular error.
Distance between antennas
/**
l^^^ \ Antenna #1
1 T^""^^^ /boresight axis
- l^^^ \ Antenna #2
[N. /boresight axis
Figure 6. Antenna beam radiation patterns in phase-comparison monopulse radar.
Figure 6 shows the antenna radiation pattern for a phase-comparison
monopulse radar. Because the antennas radiate separate parallel beams, the
amplitude of the target echo signals coming from far field targets are very nearly
the same value, but the phases are not the same depending on the relative dis-
tances from the target to each of the respective antennas, i.e., path length or
phase length differences. This situation is illustrated in Figure 7.
The line of sight to the target makes an angle 6 to the equisignal direc-
tion, as shown in Figure 7. R
]
representing the distance to the target from an-
tenna 1, is :
*i R-4-smd (2.1)
and the distance to the target from antenna 2 is:
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R, = R + 4-smd (2.2)
The difference between these offsets is
AR = R2 - R { =dsmd (2.3)
This can be used to determine the phase difference :
A<p = -— = —— a sin
A A
(2.4)




Figure 7. Wavefront phase relationships in phase comparison monopulse radar.
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For small angles where sin 6^0, the phase difference between the echo
signals in the two antennas is :
Atf>*-y-rf0 (2.5)
There exists a linear relationship between phase difference and angular
error. It may be used to position the antennas via a servo-control loop.
In the phase-comparison principle, as applied to missile guidance, the
phase difference between the signals in two fixed antennas is measured with a
servo-controlled phase shifter located in one of the arms. The servo loop adjusts
the phase shifter until the difference in phase between the two channels is a null.
The amount of phase shift which has to be generated to make a null signal is a
measure of the angular error.
Both the amplitude-comparison monopulse and the phase-comparison
monopulse trackers use two antenna beams for one coordinate tracking. The
measurements carried out by the two systems are different from each other.
Therefore the characteristics of the antenna beams will be different, also. In the
amplitude-comparison monopulse the two beams point in slightly different di-
rections because the antenna difference patterns are offset from the antenna
boresight line. This type of pattern can be generated by using one reflector with
two feed horns side by side. For two coordinate tracking, it will require at least
four feed horns. Any difference in the amplitudes between the two antenna out-
puts in the amplitude-comparison system is a result of differences in amplitude
and not phase. In contrast with this the phase-comparison monopulse measures
phase differences only and is not concerned with amplitude difference.
Even though tracking radars based on the phase-comparison monopulse
principle have been employed, this has not been widely used compared with other
angle-tracking techniques. The disadvantage of phase-comparison monopulse is
that the sum signal has higher sidelobes due to the separation of the two anten-
nas. However, this problem can be reduced by overlapping the antenna
apertures.
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III. ECM TECHNIQUES AGAINST MONOPULSE RADARS
A. DENIAL JAMMING
Denial jamming is defined as the technique that effects a victim radar re-
ceiver so that its effective use is denied [Ref. 7: p. 55]. This terminology is also
used to illustrate noise jamming, which consists of transmitting a noiselike signal
in the victim's radar receiver bandwidth.
Maximum jamming power output depends on the ratings of available de-
vices, power supply limitation, power limitations of waveguides, antenna, and
other components, etc. For the jammer to get the maximum power per unit
bandwidth, the bandwidth should be made as narrow as possible and the fre-
quency spectrum matched to the victim radar receiver. In the most cases, the de-
nial jamming bandwidth should be greater than the victim receiver bandwidth to
allow for frequency set-on tolerances, drift of jammer or receiver, or to jam se-
veral radar receivers simultaneously.
Denial jamming is also called noise jamming. The objective of noise jamming
is to obscure the true target echo by inserting the jammer noise signal into the
victim radar receiver. Noise jamming is generated by AM or FM modulating an
RF carrier wave with noise, and transmitting the result at the victim radar's fre-
quency. The radar receiver detects relatively weak return signals from the target,
therefore radar receivers must have very high sensitivity. This sensitivity causes
the radar to be vulnerable to noise jamming because the jamming signal is usually
of far greater amplitude than a returning echo signal from a target. The radar
system can detect its target in a back ground of ambient noise. However, the
SNR must be much greater than one in order to reliably detect the target. If
SNR is one or less, due to the effects of noise jamming, the radar will not be able
to evaluate the skin return from the target.
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Denial jamming is often classified according to the emission bandwidth of the
jammer. The following techniques can be applied to the monopulse acquisition
and tracking radar jamming.
1. Swept Spot Jamming
Swept spot jamming is a kind of denial jamming where jamming fre-
quency is swept across the band. Spot jamming is capable of concentrating jam-
ming power against one particular fixed radar frequency, but it cannot jam as
efficiently an entire radar frequency band. Nowadays, many radars use fre-
quency agile techniques to counter against spot noise jamming.
In order to jam radar systems with both high power density and over a
wide frequency band, swept spot jamming is nevertheless employed. Swept spot
jamming tunes the high power jamming signal across a wide frequency band with
sweep rates corresponding to the victim radars if frequency. Thereby all pre-
determined victim radars over the desired frequency band including frequency
agile radars are affected by the jamming signal, as shown in Figure 8. The
bandwidth of swept spot jamming thus a little bigger than the victim radar



















Figure 8. Swept spot jamming.
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2. Barrage Jamming
Barrage jamming comprises the spreading of noiselike jamming energy
over a wide frequency band, such that many victim radars or a single broadband
radar can be jammed over a whole radar band simultaneously.
Barrage jamming with wide band noiselike jamming power may be gen-
erated in many ways. For example, various types of modulated electromagnetic
waves can be used for the low-power sources, like semiconductor RF oscillators.
For high-power source devices like the traveling wave tube (TWT) are used. Di-
rect noise amplification (DINA) is produced by passing band-limited Gaussian
noise from a low-power source through a high-power amplifier.
There are several variations of barrage jamming depending on the jam-
ming circuitry. Figure 9 shows basic barrage jamming.
Jamming power
density spectrum
Victim radar signals -
Figure 9. Barrage jamming.
3. Blinking
Blinking jamming utilizes noise jamming whose spectrum covers the
bandpass of the victim radar and the jamming signal alternately turns on and off
at approximately a 50% duty cycle [Ref. 7: p.481]. Blinking jamming waveforms
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Figure 10. Blinking jamming waveforms.
In order to effectively jam a track-on-jam radar receiver, jammer on time
should just exceed the time it takes the radar to go into its track-on-jam mode.
The jammer off time should be just less than the time that it takes the radar to
reacquire the target. Good blinking jamming maintains the radar either searching
for the target or in the process of going into track-on-jam mode. Typical blink
rates are in the low audio frequency range.
For blinking to be most effective, two or more synchronized blinking
jammers, which are angularly separated, are required. In the case of aircraft,
they can be installed on two individual aircraft. These jammers are located within
the radar antennas beam but at slightly different angles. The jammers are alter-
nately turned on and off so that the victim radar receives the strong noise signal
from alternate angles around a mid point. The antenna of a single target-tracking
radar will attempt to shift its tracking direction as the jammers are turned on and
off, provided that the noise jamming is of sufficient strength. Depending on the
interaircraft control link, this technique can be classified by five different classes,


































































Figure 11. Blinking, synchronized multiaircraft.
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When blinking is working properly, the victim radar will track from one
jamming source to another in turn. This may cause the radar tracker to break-
lock. Otherwise the radar tracker will have erroneous target information. Thus
the control of a missile is more difficult and a missile guided by the tracking radar
will miss the target due to the inaccurate target angle position information. For
the maximum miss distance, the blinking rate must be considered. If the blinking
rate is too high, the tracker will attenuate the jam signal. If it is too low, the
missile will be able to home in on one jammer by determining precisely the an-
gular position of individual aircraft. Optimum blinking rates are from one half
to ten Hertz [Ref. 9: p.3d-21].
B. DECEPTION JAMMING
Denial jamming can deny range information, but it may not deny azimuth
and elevation information to a fire control radar if several denial jammers are not
employed at different locations simultaneously. Thus a missile may hit a target
which has a denial jammer for own self-protection.
However, deception jamming provides a little different method against fire
control and missile guidance radars in order to decrease the aircraft kill proba-
bility by the missile. The objective of deception jamming is to confuse or deceive
the true target echo by inserting properly altered replicas of the true target echo
into the victim radar systems. This technique will make it impossible to get the
correct information by providing many realistic false targets on the display. De-
ception jamming may be able to degrade the accuracy of tracking information
not only in range and velocity, but also in azimuth and elevation. If angle jam-
ming related to azimuth and elevation is implemented successfully, in general, it
can cause the victim tracking radar to break lock.
The basic form of deception jamming is repeater jamming. Its implementa-
tion is to reradiate modified replicas of the received victim radar signal correlating
with time delay. The conspicuous characteristics of repeater jamming is to
coherently store the victim radar signal in the ECM set. This is done by using a
frequency memory such as a TWT combined with a delay line in a loop. The
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output is gated out of the loop at successively earlier or later time, simulating
range walk.
The technique employed to degrade the accuracy of the azimuth and ele-
vation tracking circuits depends on the tracking technique that is used by the
victim radar. Therefore deceptive jamming must be matched to the character-
istics of the victim radar.
Typically, deception jamming can be categorized in three ways, depending
on the radar parameter to be "deceived" such as; range, velocity and angle. The
range gate walkoff technique represents range deception, velocity gate walkoff
technique represents doppler deception and several angle deception jamming
techniques are applicable to either the monopulse or sequential lobing acquisition
and tracking radars. Angle deception techniques against monopulse radars can
conveniently be divided into two kinds. The first category of angle jamming takes
advantage of the weaknesses in the design of certain monopulse radar systems to
single source jammers. Such techniques are cross-polarization, skirt frequency
jamming, image jamming, etc. The second one uses multiple sources which dis-
tort the electromagnetic wave's angle-of-arrival at the monopulse antenna. These
techniques utilize the weakness basic to all monopulse tracking systems. Typical
example is cross-eye jamming and cooperative repeater blinking. The various de-
ception jamming techniques are introduced in the following sections.
1. Range Gate Walkoff
Range gate walkoff (RGWO) is defined as "a self screening ECM tech-
nique for use against automatic range tracking radars that captures the victim
radar's range gate, walks it off in range, and then turns off, leaving the range gate
with no signal" [Ref. 7: p.l 15]. There are several other names for this technique:
range gate capture, pulloff. grabber, grabbing, stealer, deception, dropping,
dumping, selecting or confusion.
This technique is a fundamental deception ECM technique against au-
tomatic tracking radars which employ the split gate to measure and track the
target range. The gate is swiftly controlled by a range servo mechanism. The
width of gate is varied according to the antenna modes. In tracking mode, the
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width of gate is similar in size to the victim radar pulse width. In acquisition
mode, the gate will be increased in length to several times the radar pulse dura-
tion. A corollary function of the gate is to reject spurious return echo signals
which are not within the gate. The range gate is accurately centered at the target
return echo during normal radar operation. RGWO technique exploits the
characteristics of the range gate to produce range errors. RGWO jamming is
typically implemented as follows: [Ref. 7: pp. 786-787].
(a) The victim radar pulse is received, amplified, and retransmitted with
minimum time delay by the jammer. This provides a strong "return" signal, as a
beacon would, to the victim radar receiver. A strong "return'" causes the victim
radar to decrease the overall receiver gain by the operation of AGC circuitry.
True target signal, the "skin return", is decreased in gain and the range gate is
captured by the strong jamming (beacon) signal. This phase is called the dwell.
(b) By then gradually increasing the time delay, the range gate tracks the
strong repeater signal. Hence, it gradually walks off from the true target range.
This phase is called walk.
(c) As soon as the jammer reaches the walk limit, it is turned off. This
phase is called off or drop. When the jammer turns off. the radar has no target
in the range gate and must return to the acquisition or range search routine.
(d) The procedure is repeated continuously by the jammer thereby con-
tinually interrupting range tracking and seriously degrading range tracking accu-
racy. The walk off rate is in the range of 1 \i s sec for up to 10 seconds.
2. Velocity Gate \\ alkoff
Velocity gate walkoff (VGWO) is defined as "a self screening ECM
technique for use against automatic velocity tracking radars, that captures the
victim radar's velocity gate, walks it off in velocity, and then turns off, leaving the
velocity gate with no signal" [Ref. 7: p. 145]. There are several other names for
this technique: velocity gate capture, pulloff, grabber, grabbing, stealer, decep-
tion, dropping, dumping, selecting or confusion.
Some radars depend on the doppler shift of the target return echo in or-
der to get the target velocity information. The measurement and tracking q[
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doppler shift is accomplished by the velocity gate. VGWO exploits the charac-
teristics of the velocity gate, which tracks the frequency of a strong echo signal.
The frequency shift operation of VGWO jammer can be achieved by the
serrodyne technique using a TWT. VGWO jamming can be implemented as fol-
lows: [Ref. 7: pp.937-941].
(a) Victim radar signal is received, amplified coherently, and retransmit-
ted to furnish a strong repeated signal, such as a beacon, to the victim radar re-
ceiver. The strong repeated signal causes the radar receiver gain to decrease
because of the activation of AGC. As a result ofAGC action, the real target echo
signal is suppressed and the repeater captures the velocity gate of the victim radar
receiver. This step is also called dwell period, as in RGWO.
(b) The doppler frequency of the repeated signal is sequentially changed,
or walked, either in an increasing or decreasing direction. This will cause the vic-
tim radar to track the doppler frequency of the jamming signal rather than that
of the real target. This step is the walk phase.
(c) Upon reaching the walk limit, the repeater is turned off. This will
cause the victim radar to breaklock. The victim radar then returns to the acqui-
sition mode and searches for the targets frequency again. If the victim radar fails
to reacquire the real target, it may falsely lock to a spurious low level signal. This
step is the off period.
(d) Above procedures are repeated through such VGWO cycle. RGWO
and VGWO must be done in a coordinated manner for most efficient use of these
ECM techniques.
3. Skirt Frequency Jamming
The definition of skirt jamming is that "skirt frequency jamming refers to
jamming on the skirts of the frequency response curve of the radar receiver. Its
effectiveness depends on unbalance between the sum and difference channels, at
these frequencies, where rapid phase shifts are present in each channel. Of course,
it can be effectively countered by careful design and construction of the radar"
[Ref. 7: p. 843].
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Skirt frequency jamming can also be used with pulse repeater jamming.
When the ECM set detects the victim radar signal, it will transmit a jamming
signal which is offset from the victim radars frequency. This offset frequency by
the ECM set will produce a beat signal with the victim radar local oscillator. The
beat signal will appear on each side of the passband spectrum, or on the passband
skirts. Stable phase control of the victim radars phase detector will be hard to
attain because of the necessary bandpass. Consequently, the phase-tracking er-

















Figure 12. Block diagram of the skirt frequency jamming.
Figure 12 shows the block diagram of skirt frequency jamming. A de-
tector provides the input signal to the pulser. When the received victim radar
frequency, / , fed into the balanced mixer, the balanced mixer generates two
sideband jamming signals alft -f and/ + f where/ is the center frequency of
the victim radar and f is the local oscillator frequency of the jammer. These
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jamming signals contain very little receiving signal frequency, as shown in
Figure 13. The victim radar receiver will detect jamming signals at the skirt
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Figure 13. Waveform of skirt frequency jamming.
4. Delta Jamming
Delta jamming is a self-screening ECM technique that causes erroneous
angle tracking by transmitting two RF signals at two different frequencies, fx and
f2 . The spacing of/ —f2 is usually equal to the IF center frequency of the victim
radar. This frequency separation can be controlled so as to make false IF signals
in the victim radar IF amplifier. By forming false IF signals, the victim radar
control circuits can be made unstable or will have incorrect bias.
There are several other names for this technique: dual-frequency,




















Figure 14. Delta jamming block diagram.
Figure 14 shows a delta jamming block diagram for generating two RF
frequencies. Two set-on oscillators are used to lock on to the received victim ra-
dars frequency. Frequency offset controls of both oscillators allow the locked
jammer frequency to be displaced by exact amounts from the victim radars fre-
quency. In order to allow synchronized operation of both power amplifiers, the
victim radar pulse detector circuit is used. Each set-on oscillator has its own high
power TWT amplifier and radiating antenna [Ref. 7: pp. 602-605].
5. Image Jamming
Image jamming is a self-screenig ECM technique for use against tracking
radars dependent on phase-sensing for angle tracking, as in phase-comparison
monopulse radar. The definition of image jamming is as follows: "Image jamming
occurs at the image frequency of the radar, depending on the fact that the phase
angle at IF, between two signals (image frequency and local oscillator) is the re-
verse of that which would appear at the IF if the two signals were at the normal
frequencies of the receiver. Since the phase-comparison monopulse determines
the direction of the error by the direction of the phase difference between two
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signals, image jamming causes the antenna to be driven away from the target if
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Figure 15. Image jamming block diagram and waveforms.
Figure 15 shows an image jamming block diagram and its frequency
spectrum. The amplified victim radar signal through the input TWT amplifier,
is fed into a mixer and an RF signal detector. Local oscillator frequency of the
jammer is equal to two times the victim radars IF frequency. The RF signal de-
tector provides an input signal for the pulser, which turns on the final pulsed
TWT for every input radar pulse. It is necessary to know the victim radars IF for
best operation.
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In the case shown in Figure 15 (a), the band stop filter takes out the
radar frequency,/, and then passes the lower sideband frequency,/ - 21 F and the
higher sideband frequency, / + 21 F, which are used as the image jamming
signals.
Figure 15 (b) shows the frequency spectrum which has the two image
jamming signals which represent the lower and upper sidebands, where/ andfLO
represents the victim radar frequency and local oscillator frequency respectively
[Ref. 7: pp. 702-704]. As an alternative, just one sideband, either the lower or the
upper side of the image jamming signal, can be generated by utilizing a simple
high pass or low pass Filter.
6. Cross-Polarization Jamming
This is a self-screening jamming technique which causes angular error in
tracking radars, including monopulse. Some monopulse radars provide erroneous



























Figure 16. Block diagram of cross-polarization pulse repeater.
2S
polarization of the radar transmitter. Cross-polarization jamming [Ref. 7:
pp.579-585] takes advantage of this characteristics of those radar systems.
Figure 16 shows the repeater system employing two separated cross-
polarized receiving and transmitting antennas. The horizontally polarized signal
is radiated as a vertically polarized signal, and the vertically received signal is
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Figure 17. Components of polarization.
Figure 17 shows the polarization components of the signals. The
polarization components of the victim radar signal appearing at the jamming
platform are dark arrows. The horizontal polarization component of the received
victim radar signal is used for producing the vertical polarization component of
the jammer which is then retransmitted to the victim radar antenna through the
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TWT amplifier chain without 180° phase shift. On the other hand, the vertical
polarization component of the received victim radar signal is used for producing
the horizontal polarization component of the jammer and is shifted by 180°
,
after
which it is then retransmitted to the victim radar antenna through a second TWT
amplifier chain. The function of the 180° phase shifter is equivalent to a 180°
direction change of the electric field vector. When these modified polarization
components are transmitted back to the victim radar antenna, they will super-
impose as a target echo signal which is cross polarized to the skin echo.
The effects are very similar to cross-eye with a sum null on boresight, and
a pair of difference nulls each side of boresight as in Figure 19 (b) and
Figure 20 (b). respectively.
7. Cross-Eye Jamming
This is a ECM technique that generates angular errors in monopulse ra-
dars by radiating phase-controlled repeated pulses using separate antennas
mounted on an aircraft or other platform. The concept of cross eye is to use two
out-of-phase ECM sources producing either nulls or phase front angular dis-
tortion due to the interference between two jamming sources.
One method of describing the cross-eye concept [Ref. 7: pp.555-576]. is
to use two ECM sources which have equal amplitudes and are 180° out of phase,
as shown in Figure IS. This figure shows the aircraft approaching normal to the
victim radars beam direction. The antenna mounted on the nose section is a re-
ceive only antenna which provides the victim radar signal information to the two
ECM sets. The received signal is divided, amplified, and phase controlled so that
the two ECM sets reradiate repeater jamming signals that have the same ampli-
tude but are 180° out of phase with each other. The two jamming signals will
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Figure 18. Cross-eye concept applied to a radar.
The two transmitting antennas are installed d feet apart, typically one
on each wing. Thus the signal transmitted by the left wing antenna will travel
dsin 6 more than that by the right wing antenna, making the first right side null
point on line AB. Line AB represents the fact that the radar doesn't have to be
looking perpendicular to the jammer baseline for cross-eye to be effective. The
nulls will occur whenever dsin 8 equals n). where n is any integer and '/. is the
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radar wavelength. For finding the null positions, two equations can be derived
as follows:
n/. = d sin 6 (3.1)
5 = rtan0 (3.2)
For the first null, n should be one. Solving for 6 and s, (sin 6^ tan 6 = Brad when
6 is small):
"-"""(-jM (33)
iwfl = r4 (3.4)
where is the first null angle at the aircraft
s is the null distance from the centerline
r is the distance from jamming aircraft to victim radar.
The relationship between s. r, and d can be explained from the equation
(3.4). As the aircraft moves closer to the radar site and or the distance between
two ECM sets is increased the spacing between nulls, which is related to the
jamming effectiveness, is decreased.
When cross-eye jamming is operating, the victim radar receiver detects
steep spatial jamming lobes of opposite polarity on either side of the centerline,
or any other null. These lobes are detectable because the jammer signal is
stronger than the skin return and result in angular tracking errors (usually
azimuth) of a few degrees at most.
The following figures show the relative signal voltage vs scan angle, which
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Figure 21. Patterns of the difference channel divided by sum channel, (a) One
source, (b) Two sources.
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Figure 19 shows the sum channel. There is no null point on the
boresight axis for one source (a), but two sources (cross eye) produce a null on the
boresight axis (b). Figure 20 shows the difference channel. There is a null point
on the boresight axis for one source. But two sources have two null points, each
at the cross-eye angle (6CE) on both sides of the boresight axis. Figure 21 shows
the difference channel divided by the sum channel. Figure 21 (a) corresponds to
Figure 3 (d). Figure 21 (b) is the result of cross-eye so that the nulls move, one
to each side of boresight. Thus the radar can track either null in Figure 20 (b)









Figure 22. Warped phase front.
Another way to describe the cross-eye concept is phase front distortion.
Under cross-eye conditions an interferometry pattern is produced as shown in
Figure 22. This concept utilizes the the property of any radar tracking antenna
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which is to be aligned with the face parallel (actually tangent) to the wave front
of the signal being tracked. The distorted phase front of the electromagnetic
wave is shown in the interferometry pattern Figure 22. The victim radar an-
tenna will align itself with the boresight normal to the distorted phase front, re-
sulting in angular tracking error. Therefore cross-eye is also known as phase
front distortion. The peaks in Figure 18 correspond to path length differences
of n













Figure 23. Block diagram of basic repeater type cross-eye system.
A block diagram of a cross-eye system, which employs a repeater, is
shown in Figure 23. The basic concept of the system operation is the same as the
previous explanation. A center receive-only antenna feeds a TWT amplifier
whose output power is split so as to drive two transmitting antennas with 180°
out of phase signals. However, the system shown in Figure 23 has a basic prob-
lem in that the perpendicular bisector of the line joining the two ECM antennas
must continuously intersect the radar site so as to maximize cross-eve jamming
effects. Any maneuver incurring antenna yaw will degrade the jamming
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effectiveness. In order to eliminate this problem, two separate, automatically
compensating repeater paths are used as in Figure 24. The relative placements
of the two transmit and receive antennas result in automatic path length
compensations. Thus the two signals radiated by the jammers will remain 180°
out of phase at the victim radar regardless of the angle of arrival of the victim









Figure 24. Block, diagram of cross-eye system using two separate repeater path.
C. PASSIVE COUNTERMEASURES
1. Chaff
Chaff is one of the earliest radar ECM devices, also known as
"window" in the UK. It is still a very useful technique, applicable to nearly all
radars except some moving target indicator (MTI) radars.
Chaff consists of resonant dipoles. used to reradiate RF energy, to gen-
erate multiple echo effects and false targets on the radar display. According to
the electromagnetic theory of chaff, a piece of chaff acts like a dipole whose
3S
output terminals are short circuited. In the case of a dipolc, the greatest
reradiation occurs when the dipole length is approximately a half wavelength of
the incident RF energy [Ref. 9: p.3L-3]. Therefore by cutting to a half
wavelength of a specified RF frequency, maximum effect by the chaff will be
attained.
Materials used for chaff are conducting or nonconducting fibers coated
with a conducting material like aluminum or zinc. The general forms are ribbons
of aluminum foil, silver-coated nylon thread, and glass fiber coated with a con-
ducting material. The thickness of a foil should be as thin as possible, because the
falling rate decreases the thinner the foil.
Chaff length is proportional to the wavelength. If the frequency is high
or wavelength is short, chaff length should be short. If the frequency is low or
wavelength is long, chaff length should be long. Long chaff length increases its
falling rate. Chaff is not used much below 1GHz for this reason. To cover B, C
band radars, rope is often used instead of chaff [Ref. 9: p.3L-7].
Chaff can be applied in combination with other jamming techniques to
upgrade the effectiveness of jamming. Various chaff missions are also possible.
Representatively, these involve chaff corridor screening, chaff confusion and sat-
uration, chaff deception, signal attenuation, and self-protection missions.
Chaff corridor screening missions deny strike aircraft information inside
the corridor to the victim radars. Chaff confusion and saturation missions over-
load the victim radar scope with false echoes returned by the chaff. Thus the
victim radar operator cannot discern the true targets on his radar display. Chaff
deception missions create signals like true targets on the radar displays. To
achieve this mission, chaff cloud size should be greater than the radar cross sec-
tion (RCS) of individual targets by an amount equal to the expected MTI im-
provement factor of the victim radars. In this way effective returns from the chaff
after MTI processing should be similar to the returning echo signal from the air-
craft targets. Signal attenuation missions reduce target detection ranges of the
victim radars. To achieve this purpose, chaff clouds must have large chaff density
per unit volume at the victim radar frequencies. The result is the effect of a
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greatly increased propagation lose because of the intense back scattering of the
radar forward energy. Self protection missions deploys chaff in order to cause the
victim radars to break lock on own aircraft. The effectiveness of this technique
will be increased when accompanied by a simultaneous evasive maneuver [Ref.
10].
2. Radar Absorbing Material
Radar absorbing material (RAM) is used to reduce the RCS by absorb-
ing impinging electromagnetic energy. Thus, the reduced target size will appar-
ently be decreased, along with the target detection range.
One type of RAM is made by using a radar semitransparent layer on the
surface of the vehicle. The reflected and transmitted energy (50% each) recom-
bine destructively at the surface, resulting in up to 20dB RCS reduction. This is
good only in a narrow band due to the fixed thickness of the semitransparent
layer [Ref. 11: p. 101]. (approximately -H
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Another type of RAM is a dissipator, which attenuates the incident
electromagnetic wave [Ref. 7: p.405]. This absorber can reduce the energy re-
flection over a wider frequency band, but is usually thicker.
Still another type of RAM is an absorbent paint, containing microscopic
particles of an iron compound in the ferrite family. Absorbent paint can give
RCS reductions of up to 20 dB. It is used for absorption mostly above 10 GHz.
Such paint can be applied to almost any aircraft surface but there is still a weight
penalty [Ref. 12: pp.49-50],
3. Stealth
Stealth has been a highly classified technology untill now. It combines
RAM techniques with others and can be applied to any kind of weapon system
which can be detected by radar, including aircraft.
RCS is not the only concern in stealth technology. The design concept
of the stealth aircraft also includes avoidance of detection by infra red (IR)
scanner, optical, acoustic, smoke and contrails [Ref. 13: p. 28].
In reference to radar ECM. however, the only interesting point of the
stealth aircraft is related to detection evasion bv enemy radar. For that reason,
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RCS reduction plays an important role in stealth aircraft. In order for stealth
aircraft to reduce RCS, RAM and counter reflective geometry can be employed.
RAM, as discussed above, contributes to RCS reduction by absorbing or atten-
uating incident electromagnetic energy. In addition, radar absorbing structures
(RAS) and radar transparent structures, which are constructed of composite
materials, are used to reduce weight as well as RCS. Two geometric methods are
used to scatter the radar beam, rather than reflect it, from the surface of the
stealth aircraft. "One is to make the shape flat or rectilinear, concentrating the
reflection on one bearing, and reducing the tendency for concave surfaces to
function as retro reflectors over large ranges of angles of incidence. The other is
to scatter the wave with a carefully designed concave curve of constantly chang-
ing radius, so that each tiny part of the surface has its own tiny main-lobe re-
flection." [Ref. 14: p. 22]. Two kinds of stealth aircraft have been introduced
recently by the USAF. F-117A, a stealth fighter, is based on the first method,
and the B-2. a stealth bomber, combines both methods.
D. DECOYS
Decoys are a support ECM techniques that utilize low cost vehicles equipped
with different jamming augmentation systems. Decoys can be employed by a va-
riety of techniques using different delivery vehicles employing a variety of
jammers. Typical examples ol^ this tactics application are expendable jammers
and remotely piloted vehicles. These jamming techniques are not peculiar against
monopulse radar systems, but are commonly applied to any radar.
1. Expendable Jammer
Expendable jammer (EJ) consists of the jammer and its delivery package,
such as parachute, rocket, expendable drone and remotely piloted vehicle (RPV).
Most EJ are small, light weight, and cheap. Output jamming power of one unit
may not be adequate to jam a given radar, therefore, several EJs may be required
to achieve satisfactory radar capture by decay. By definition, EJ is not recovered
for reuse. This is quite different compared with a recoverable RPV.
The most important factor, therefore, in EJ employment is cost effec-
tiveness. To be cost effective, the life cvcle cost of EJs should be less than that of
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the platform and alternate ECM, which the EJs are protecting. The tactics of
EJ employment are very flexible, lending to a variety of scenarios of delivery
package and attached jammer. EJs are dispensed in several ways. Aircraft de-
ploy them by using forward fired rockets, free fall, parachute retarded or by
towing. When delivering EJs, if the delivery package does not have flying capa-
bility, parachutes can be used to lengthen jamming time.
2. Remotely Piloted Vehicle
This tactic utilizes a drone RPV as ECM support, to assist strike aircraft
and to confuse enemy radar. RPVs can perform various missions such as jam-
ming, chaff dispensing and EJ delivery.
RPV effectiveness as a tool of EW was demonstrated during the 1982
conflict between Israel and Syria in the Bekaa Valley, even though not used for
decoy delivery but for remotely controlled reconnaissance [Ref. 14: p. 112] and
aircraft simulation. RPVs as decoys utilize small radio controlled drones. The
use of RPV is very cheap compared with using manned aircraft.
The primary advantage of the RPV is use in a high threat environment
without loss of personnel and expensive aircraft. RPVs arc more difficult to detect
and shoot down than manned aircraft due to the their small size. Even though




The effectiveness of SAM systems is mainly governed by the precise tar-
get position informations. For this reason, most SAM systems are required to
have targeting radars. These radars greatly enhance the capability of SAM.
Meanwhile. SAM systems become vulnerable targets of the anti-radiation missile
(ARM) by working as active emitter.
In the case of high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM), the most re-
cently developed ARM in the US. operation is by locking onto enemy radar ra-
diation signal either before or after launch. Onboard RWR or the missile
guidance section can detect the enemy radar signal, then the missile is locked on
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and homes on the radar. HARM has a wideband seeker which covers all radar
bands from 2 to 40 GHz. and has an extensive parameter threat library (pulse
width (PW), PRF). HARM has three launch modes which provide flexibility of
employment, depending on the tactical situation [Ref. 14: p.930].
In stand-off mode, HARM can be fired on a trajectory for maximum
range from high altitude. The highest-priority threat signal is selected and the
location is memorized. Then accurate inertial navigation system (INS) allow
HARM to continue the attack even if the radar system is turned off after the
launch of missile.
In target-of-opportunity mode, the received threat signals are displayed
in the cockpit. Pilot can select the radar target.
In self-protection mode, the radar warning receiver (RWR) detects, sorts,
and indicates immediate threats to the aircraft.
Because of these characteristics, HARM is capable of coping with many
SAM radar threats.
2. Wild Weasel Tactics
"Wild Weasel" is a nickname for an aircraft which performs special
missions relating to destruction or suppression of enemy air defense systems.
Their primary mission is to provide a safe corridor for the air strike forces using
integrated weapon systems. In order for the Wild Weasel to carry out this kind
of mission, it needs a sophisticated electronic equipment such as a launch com-
puter system, specialized radar warning and location system and ARM or other
destructive weapons.
Wild Weasel aircraft have been continuously updated by the improve-
ment of technology. The US Wild Weasel aircraft were F-lOOFs and F-105Gs.
In the beginning of Vietnam war, F-lOOFs Wild Weasel aircraft were equipped
with an unsophisticated radar warning system designed to intercept and home in
on the SA-2 radar signal. It could only detect one target signal at any one time.
They had to directly home in on the SAM radar site until the crew visually lo-
cated the site, then come back again and drop conventional bombs on the area
in an effort to destrov the SAM svstems. This tactic was extremelv dangerous
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because the crew couldn't detect any other sites near that the area [Ref. 15:
pp.20-26]. However, low level attack of the Wild Weasel in those day was very
effective in devastating enemy SAM sites. In 1966, Two-seat F-105G aircraft
with shrike ARM replaced the old Wild Weasel.
After Vietnam, F-4Gs, following F-4Cs, became the primary Weasel
aircraft. The F-4G Wild Weasel aircraft is a modified version of F-4E aircraft.
For F-4G Wild Weasels, an airborne RWR was installed instead of 20mm nose
gun in the F-4E. This RWR can detect and locate the enemy radar emitters, and
identify each threat such as SAM or AAA sites. Wild Weasel then attacks the
selected target from outside lethal range. USAF is considering F-15 or F-16 air-
craft as future Wild Weasels.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF ECM TECHNIQUES
A. DENIAL JAMMING
Denial jamming or noise jamming is not the most efficient method to use
against tracking radars because most tracking radars are able to maintain angle
tracking by locking on to the noise jamming source. Applying noise type jamming
to tracking radars may increase the vulnerability of the jamming aircraft since the
jamming source may act like a beacon signal [Ref. 16: p. 138].
The principal effect of the noise type jamming against monopulse radar is to
deny the target range information. In monopulse radar systems, denial jamming
will deny range information if the jam-to-signal ratio is equal or greater than one.
A missile system utilizing monopulse radar guidance may or may not be able to
effect a kill without range information, depending on system performance spec-
ifications or missile launch range. However, the operating effectiveness of the
ground missile system will be degraded without providing accurate range data,
even though modern missile guidance systems can operate with angle data only.
The main advantage of noise jamming is that precise information about the
victim radar system is not required. One needs to know only the center frequency
and bandwidth of the victim radar to perform denial jamming. Generally speak-
ing, noise jamming is less efficient than deceptive jamming methods because de-
nial jamming does not accurately match the parameters between the jammer and
the victim radar. Thus the circuitry for denial jamming is simpler than that for
deception jamming. The simpler circuitry generally implies lower cost.
The effectiveness of noise jamming techniques such as swept spot, barrage
and blinking, described in chapter three, is hard to quantify. The jamming ef-
fectiveness may be differently evaluated depending on the tactical situation and
available information about enemy weapon systems performance. However,
these kinds of noise jamming will at least effectively degrade the performance of
any radar against which they are employed.
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1. Swept Spot Jamming
The advantage of swept spot jamming is that it can concentrate the high
jamming power on each victim radar while sweeping across a wide frequency
band. The disadvantage is that the jamming is intermittent due to the sweeping
time. This drawback can be reduced by increasing the sweeping rate. Swept spot
jamming with fast sweeping rates produces approximately continuous jamming
effects. Again, the optimum rate corresponds to the victims bandwidth, inferred
from measurements of his pulse width.
2. Barrage Jamming
The use of this type of jammer is attractive because frequency agile ra-
dars can be jammed without readjusting the jamming frequency, as wrell as be-
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Figure 25. Barrage jamming power vs bandwidth.
As shown in Figure 25 the disadvantage of barrage jamming is that the
jamming power density is diluted by being spread over a wide frequency band-
width. The power density of barrage jamming is inversely proportional to its
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bandwidth. The jamming effectiveness depends on jammer power density. If
jamming power is constant, the wider the jammer's bandwidth the lower the
power density [Ref. 17: pp.52-54].
3. Blinking
This is one of the most effective ECM techniques available to the ECM
designer for protecting a formation of aircraft, because it works against any type
of tracker including the monopulse tracker.
The disadvantage of blinking jamming is the difficulty in determining the
optimum blinking rate, even though the best rate is undoubtedly on the order of
the tracking servo bandwidth, or in the 0.1 to 10 Hz range [Ref. 16: p. 156].
B. DECEPTION JAMMING
Deception jamming is generally implemented in the form of the self-screening
ECM mission in order to jam against missile guidance which utilizes tracking ra-
dars [Ref. 16: p. 138]. Self-screening or self-protection jamming is more applica-
ble to the attack aircraft due to the jamming power and the physical size
limitations on the jammer.
Deception jamming requires significantly less power to jam a radar compared
with noise jamming. This is because deception jamming uses a waveform
matched to the victim radar. Small size is desirable to afford more room for ar-
mament loading. In addition, lower power availability requires the jammer to be
small size.
Deception jamming techniques discussed in chapter three have different
jamming characteristics. RGWO as range deception technique is easy and rela-
tively efficient way to jam against monopulse radar because monopulse radars
use a conventional range gate for measuring the distance from radar to target.
VGWO as velocity deception technique is a useful way to induce false doppler
frequency shift. As a result, the victim radar can get false range rate information.
In general, angle deception is difficult to achieve against monopulse tracking ra-
dars compared with sequential lobing radars. Monopulse techniques are inher-
ently strong against angle deception jamming because they use simultaneous
beams to determine the target position. In order to enhance jamming
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effectiveness, it is imperative to closely combine these three categories of
deception ECM (DECM) techniques with one another.
Meanwhile, deception jamming systems employ complicated circuits to
match the characteristics of each type of system to be jammed. Complexity of
system will demand more expenditure. To properly match the jamming parame-
ters between the jammer and the victim radar systems, these techniques will re-
quire specific information about the victim radars. If such information is not
available, it may greatly impact on the use of deception jammers.
1. Range Gate Walkoff
False target range information in the missile guidance and tracking ra-
dar, such as SAM targeting monopulse radar, can produce aiming-guidance er-
ror. However, target angle information is still good enough to direct against the
target angular position. The radar can guide the semi-active missile with target
angle information only.
In monopulse radar application of RGWO, followed by dropping of the
deceptive signal, the result can be a partial loss of information. If angular de-
ception is not simultaneously used, the victim radar will reacquire the skin echo
too fast.
2. Velocity Gate Walkoff
VGWO technique is very similar to RGWO technique. But RGWO by
itself may not be effective against some radars which employ target doppler
measurements because those radars constantly check the target velocity data by
differentiating range data and comparing to measured target doppler data.
In order for the victim radar not to reject the jamming signal by way of
doppler filtering. VGWO should be combined with RGWO and angle deception
technique. If the victim radar doesn't exploit the doppler characteristics, the ef-
fects of VGWO is very little.
3. Skirt Frequency Jamming
The jammer used in skirt jamming is a little detuned from the victim ra-
dars frequency. Well designed monopulse radars (}o not ha\e vulnerability to this
jamming because this technique basically uses the weakness in the design of the
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monopulse tracking systems. The tracking accuracy of some monopulse systems
is degraded if the receiver is not properly tuned to the echo signal so that the echo
signal lies in the skirts of the IF filter.
4. Delta Jamming
Delta jamming technique needs high powered TWT amplifiers and high gain an-
tennas in each channel in order to overcome the high losses by the mixers and
bandpass filters of the monopulse victim radars. For effective jamming, the
information on the victim radars IF bandwidth and IF control frequency are
required.
5. Image Jamming
This jamming is not a dependable jamming technique because it is inef-
fective if the monopulse radar is equipped with an image rejection filter or mixer.
6. Cross-Polarization Jamming
One advantage is that the cross-polarization ECM technique does not
need special knowledge about the victim radar. This provides design freedom
which is important in the rapidly changing field of enemy missile radar control
technology.
The critical drawback of the cross-polarization jamming is a need for
huge jamming to signal ratios approaching 20 to 40dB [Ref. 16: p. 123]. This is
because the wave guide components of the victim radar highly attenuate a cross
polarized signal.
In addition, any deviation in the polarization of the jamming signal re-
sults in a component with normal polarization. If the normal polarization com-
ponent is greater than the cross-polarization due to the attenuation, the jamming
signal will act as a good target beacon.
It has thus far been impractical to employ cross-polarization as the angle
deception jamming technique against monopulse tracking radars.
7. Cross-Eye Jamming
The magnitude of angular error is determined by separation distance,
phase shift, and amplitude ratio of two ECM sources. Maximum jamming ef-
fectiveness can be obtained when the jamming signals of the two ECM sources
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are transmitted with 180° phase shift and at equal amplitudes. Even though the
separation distances cause proportional angular error, it is difficult to implement
to much effect on the jamming effectiveness because of the limited aircraft wing
span. Separation has an extremely small value compared with the victim radar
range.
The disadvantage of cross-eye jamming, using one receiving antenna, is
dependency on the motion of the jamming aircraft. The phenomena of warped
phase front occurs near the interferometer peaks. Aircraft movement by yawing
will shift the interferometer null pattern, therefore jamming effectiveness can be
greatly degraded. Although this fault can be eliminated by using a cross-eye
system which employs two separate repeaters with equal path lengths, this tech-
nique is impractical due to cost, weight and complexity constraints.
In order for cross-eye to be effective, high jamming-to-signal is required,
as much as at least 20dB [Ref. 16: p. 123]. This is partly because the victim radar
antenna aperture is relatively small compared with the null spacing.
Another major drawback is that the angle error produced by cross-eye
is generally very small.
C. PASSIVE COUNTERMEASURES
1. Chaff
Even though MTI radar systems can provide some countermeasures
against chaff, chaff is still widely used in military jamming systems. Chaff can
jam wide bandwidth radars by using different lengths of chaff in the same
dispenser. Some chaff dispenser systems mounted on aircraft can cut chaff to the
proper length in order to match detected victim radars frequency accomplished
through use of RYVR.
Another advantage of chaff is cost effectiveness. Chaff doesn't usually
entail high cost to employ compared with other ECM techniques. When com-
paring chaff with the DECM techniques against monopulse tracking radar, chaff
provides a very cost effective ECM. Sequential lobing tracking techniques are
more susceptible to angle DECM. However, the angle jamming of tracking radar
utilizing monopulse is more difficult due to the characteristics of the monopulse
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beam pattern. The DECM receiver can sense only one steady beam and there is
no AM modulation in the transmitting beam of monopulse radars when tracking.
Therefore the DECM receiver provides no information for directing the DECM
jammer when to turn on and off. Sometimes the DECM may accentuate the
jamming aircraft position to the victim radars. DECM angle deception, from a
single source, against monopulse is not as effective as two source jamming [Ref.
18: pp.398-399].
On the other hand, chaff creates a wide spread echo signal and the re-
action of monopulse tracking radar is similar to any other tracking radars.
Monopulse trackers will track the strongest echo signal, which may be produced
by chaff. Chaff can eventually defeat a monopulse tracking radar with proper
deployments.
2. Radar Absorbing Material
In order to use RAM on the aircraft, the weight and cost factors must
be considered. The thickness of RAM depends on the frequency. The effect of
attenuation per unit depth in absorbing material will be increased, as frequency
is increased. Therefore the thickness of absorber can be decreased as frequency
is increased. RAM coatings are not very practical at low frequencies. However,
recent trends for the radar systems shows that the frequency band gradually in-
creases up to the millimeter region. Therefore the use of RAM may become more
prominent.
It will probably be attended by high cost because of the newness and
complexity of the technique.
3. Stealth
In fact, even though sophisticated stealth techniques are employed, one
cannot completely eradicate reflections to a receiving antenna. Accordingly,
SAM acquisition and tracking radar can detect skin echoes to some extent, de-
pending on the target range and the remaining RCS. The effectiveness of the
stealth fighter against the SAM is based on the fact that SAM radars have to
acquire normal-sized targets just before the target aircraft reaches SAM's lethal
range, and SAM has a minimum range because the missile has a required launch
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and acceleration time to properly track the target. In the case of the stealth
fighter. SAM radar picks up the target at considerably shorter range due to its
RCS reduction. The attacker may therefore be located inside the minimum firing
range [Ref. 12: p. 66].
D. DECOYS
1. Expendable Jammer
The use of EJs against a radar missile system can confuse enemy radar
operators. Frequently EJs are mistaken for airborne targets. Thus, they may at-
tempt to shoot down EJs with expensive missiles.
2. Remotely Piloted Vehicle
The primary advantage of the RPV is use in a high threat environment
without loss of personnel and expensive aircraft. RPVs are more difficult to detect
and shoot down than manned aircraft due to the their small size. Even though




ARM directly attacks radars by homing on the radar radiation. ARM
missiles can be installed on any type of aircraft for the purpose of self protection
against SAM radars. A trade off is necessary since ARMs utilize weapon stations
on the aircraft thereby reducing the loadout of other primary weapons.
Therefore ARM is usually delivered by specific aircraft which carry out
suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) as, for example the Wild Weasel. The
effectiveness of ARM against SAM radars was fully proved during the Vietnam
war and Iran Iraq war. Several countries have developed and produced ARM.
For example. Shrike, high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) and sidearm by
the US; Armat. supersonic tactical anti-radiation (STAR) missile by France and
air launched anti-radiation missile (ALARM) by England.
The use o^ ARM for destroying SAM systems will probably increase
because oi their standoff capability and reduced threat against own aircraft.
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2. Wild Weasel Tactics
For the performance of a successful mission, Wild Weasel uses low level
navigation tactics. Low level flight will not only make detection hard, but also the
SAM threat is decreased due to the higher ground clutter. This allows Wild
Weasel an increased element of surprise against SAM sites. The combination of
recently developed ARM, which provides a longer range and more flexible launch
capability, and Wild Weasel tactics can contribute to greatly improved sup-
pression of enemy SAM activities.
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V. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to effectively jam radars with one technique only. Individual
techniques cannot successfully achieve monopulse radar jamming. It may be
impossible to jam the radar completely even under the multiple techniques con-
dition. Each ECM technique is tailored for only a specific portion of the radar
to provide a partial jamming effect. Therefore, several ECM techniques should
be integrated with each other in order to completely jam the entire radar systems.
It is thus desirable to employ the various ECM techniques as simultaneously as
possible to enhance the overall jamming effect.
As illustrated in chapter four, some ECM techniques against monopulse ra-
dars are very impractical. Cross-polarization jamming and cross-eye jamming are
also not good techniques for application to monopulse radars due to the require-
ments of very high SNR. Image jamming is also not a dependable jamming
technique without special knowledge of the victim radar. However, the other
techniques that have been covered have a good effect on degradation of
monopulse radar performance when combined with one another.
Five different categories of ECM techniques against monopulse radar; denial
jamming, deception jamming, passive countermeasures, decoys, and destructive
countermeasures: should be well integrated to give the best result in jamming ef-
fectiveness. Denial jamming techniques have excellent jamming effects. Denial
jamming can be employed by attacking aircraft, but it is usually achieved through
standoff jamming aircraft. In deception jamming, the three jamming techniques
which are; range, velocity, and angle deception: should be integrated in the one
repeater system, as shown in Figure 26. With passive countermeasures, chaff is
very cost effective. Most attack Fighter aircraft have self protection chaff dis-
pensing capability. In addition. RAM and stealth techniques will certainly im-
pact on the future radar jamming field. In decoy methods, the use of cheap
expendable drones or RPV will greatly increase the survivability of the future
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strike aircraft. When considering probability of kill, the survivability of aircraft
is theoretically proportional to the number of targets including false targets cre-
ated by decoys. Destructive countermeasures can usually be performed by spe-
cially dedicated aircraft equipped with special weapons, ARMs, which can detect
and attack the position of radar radiation sources. The employment of ARMs































Figure 26. Block diagram of integrated deception jammer.
In conclusion, these techniques should be properly integrated to optimize
ECM techniques while conserving resources against monopulse radars. The fol-
lowing combinations are recommended as a best approach for a strike force
package.
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Attacking aircraft need to be equipped with both passive countermeasures
and integrated deception jammer. Denial jamming is performed by the standoff
jamming aircraft, which require relatively high output power. Expendable
jammers such as decoys can be carried on any of these aircraft to additionally
confuse the enemy radar operators or system. In relation with these ECM tech-
niques, evasive maneuvers have to be included to complement the jamming ef-
fectiveness. Finally, Wild Weasel type aircraft with ARM take part by
destroying forward or high threat radar systems.
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